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I
IP I T R O D U C T T O N

Appellee's brief is shot through with contradictions, equivocations, and a
disturbing lack of candor. Worse, it is plain from the brief that appellee openly urges
and expects this court to prejudice its analysis of appellant's claims by the events that
resulted in .ippcllnnl's panihil In^s ">( ltlK* ^-^"M; h» pnu fit \: l,'\> • »> I he S(;i(>' H
California about twenty-five years ago

i be sure, appellant has been eligible for re-

admission for over twenty-years now in light of a solid record of over twenty-five years
d\ «"111cI HYinrn finni iilmlioli ill! Mill tlirse nuilkTs nir IJIIIII
irrelevant to the issues before this court. And appellant, in any case, does not share
appellee's revealing expectation that this court might determine the issues in this case

years ago instead of the trial court record.
II
Appellee Is Not Entitled to Summary Adjudication of Count One of the First Cause
Of Action for Abuse of Process Contained in the First Amended Complaint Because
Appellant Controverted, by Sworn Affidavit, Appellee's Claim That Count One is
Barred by a Prior Settlement Agreement

Process contained in the First Amended Complaint alleges that appellee Toscano abused
court process by overzealously filing a Chapter 7 petition in 2008 in behalf of a client,

Section 707 (b) (2) (A) (i), 11 U.S.C. Section 707 (b) (2) (B) (I), and 11 U.S.C. Section 707
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I

Appellee asserted "prior settlement" as an affirmative defense to the claim in a

Minium linn .uniiriiii") |iuij?ment at. rordiny to llic pinnviliiics \ untamed in I llah llJules of
Civil Procedure 56 and 7 (c)(3)(A). Appellee alleged (falsely in violation of Utah Rule of
Professional Conduct 3.3) in his Statement of Undisputed Facts that he and appellant had
fhiL\ioik\l\ uUiiLxt uuitJil uiic ul tin fiirvl' cause ul iiulion (effective March Ml 2\)W).
Appellee's moving papers and the trial court transcript show plainly that appellee relied
exclusively upon his Statement of Undisputed Facts pertaining to an attached unsigned,
settlement document in his attempt to show that appellant could not present a "genuine
issue as In ,„imiy iiiiiiialkTia! fail .HI ,1 III.ml appellee was therefore entitled !o jud^menl as a mallei
of law" in accordance with Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Now, appellee claims that he
also asserted res judicata or collateral estoppel as affirmative defenses in the trial court to

law. But here is what appellee told the trial court on September 1, 2009:
Peter Guyon (for defendant Toscano): "So, this is not a question
of res judicata. It's not a question of collateral estoppel, it's a
question that Mr. Billings bargained away, whatever claims he
may have had, and that boat sailed. Those claims are no longer and
for that reason he does not have a right to assert them in this case
and that's why we're asking for summary judgment." [RT, 8, Lines
5-11]
1

Hence, if properly given the opportunity, appellant will eventually be able to show the*;
(not appellee) is entitled to summary judgment on count of the First Cause of Action fev
Abuse of Process contained in the First Amended Complaint as a matter of law.
Rule 3.3 Candor Toward the Tribunal
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false
statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawye
(3) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.
5

Perhaps the foregoing might be interpreted as an unusual, self-destructive way of asserting
res judicata or collateral estoppel as affirmative defenses. Still, the better interpretation is
that appellee simply elected to stand exclusively upon his Statement of Undisputed Facts
(and his characterization contained therein of the attached unsigned, settlement document)
and nothing more to support his motion for summary judgment.
In response to appellee's Statement of Undisputed Facts, appellant duly filed an
Affidavit Controverting Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts and an Affidavit of
Disputed Facts and Genuine Issues. In these affidavits, appellant testified upon personal
knowledge that (1) appellee Toscano had actually repudiated the parties' legitimate
January 28, 2009 settlement agreement (as amended March 30,2009); (2) that Toscano
unilaterally altered the legitimate agreement to create the sham, unsigned settlement
document, which he had submitted to the trial court in support of summary judgment, and
(3) that appellant had rejected the unilateral changes and withdrew the original offer of
settlement in writing in light of the unilateral changes. Appellant's affidavits were detailed,
specific, and exhaustive and therefore sufficient to refute (and establish disputed facts and
genuine issues pertaining to) appellee's affirmative defense of "prior settlement" to count
one of the First Cause of Action for Abuse of Process. It is well established that courts do
not decide factual disputes on summary judgment motion; they simply decide whether
there is a factual dispute or genuine issue of law. Holbrook Company v. Adams 542 P.2d
191 (Utah 1975). Summary judgment is appropriate if, and only if, there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law." Adamson v. Multi Cmtv. Diversified Services, Inc. 514 F.3d 1136, 1145 (10th Cir.
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2008). And it takes only one sworn, good faith affidavit to create a genuine issue of fact in
order to preclude summary judgment. Holbrook Company v. Adams 542 P.2d 191.
Appellee's only response to these well established authorities is to assert that
appellant is somehow barred from testifying upon personal knowledge in his affidavits
about his settlement experiences with Toscano and the ultimate breakdown of the January
28,2009 settlement agreement (as amended March 30,2010). Appellee embeds an
indiscriminate list of evidentiary objections to appellant's affidavits into his appellee's
brief, but he failed to raise even one of the objections before the district court. Accordingly,
even if appellee had managed to state a valid evidentiary objection in his brief, he
nevertheless would have waived it because he failed to assert evidentiary objections of any
sort before the district court.
Ill
Appellee has Failed to Show That The Federal Bankruptcy Court Order Approving
Settlement of the Debtor's Estate Entitles Appellee to Judgment as a Matter of Law
on Any Cause of Action Contained in the First Amended Complaint According to the
Principles of Res Judicata or Collateral Estoppel
A. Appellee Waived and Rejected the Affirmative Defenses of Res Judicata and
Collateral Estoppel
The federal bankruptcy court order approving settlement of the debtor's estate does
not impact in the least any cause of action contained in the First Amended Complaint for
several reasons. But most fundamentally, appellee is barred from even attempting to assert
that he is somehow entitled to judgment as a matter of law in light of a separate court order
because he explicitly waived and rejected the affirmative defenses of Res Judicata and
Collateral Estoppel Yet it is simply axiomatic that an order issued in a separate action
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cannot impact this action in any manner except through the due process sensitive
mechanisms of Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel.
It is impossible to tell from appellee's brief exactly what he ultimately urges this
court to believe with respect to his failure to allege res judicata or collateral estopple as
affirmative defenses in the trial court. Appellee invites this court to accept several tortuous
claims and lines of reasoning. For example, the trial court record demonstrates that
appellee asserted categorically that he knew well enough that his "prior settlement" defense
"is not a question of res judicata " and it is "not a question of collateral estoppel. " [RT, 8,
Lines 5-11]. Now appellee claims that when he told the court that his motion did not
present questions of res judicata or collateral estoppel that he was actually asserting the
defenses, not waiving them (Appellee's Brief-30). Yet in another section of his brief,
appellee is apparently asking the court to overlook his failure to assert these defenses
because he did not "knowingly" waive them or, alternatively, because he did not really
"intend" to waive them (Appellee's Brief-30). In any case, at the same time that appellee
contends that he actually asserted these affirmative defenses (or did not know that he was
waiving them), he also asks this court to excuse his failure to assert them because it is only
appropriate, according to appellee, to raise res judicata or collateral estoppel as affirmative
defenses in an answer, and appellee failed to file an answer to the complaint (Appellee's
Brief-31). This last line of reasoning appears to be that appellee's failure to assert res
judicata or collateral estoppel as affirmative defenses on summary judgment motion is
excused by his prior failure (or refusal) to assert them in an answer. Appellee cites no cases
in support of his odd proposition, which in any case contradicts his initial proposition that
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he actually asserted res judicata or collateral estoppel (he does not say which) as
affirmative defenses. Appellee himself makes his credibility a serious issue.
B. Appellee Also Failed to Show That the Bankruptcy Court Order Otherwise
Satisfied the Requirements of Either Res Judicata or Collateral Estoppel.
Under Utah law, res judicata (claim preclusion) does not apply unless three
requirements are met: (1) [t]he subsequent action must involve the same parties, their
privies, or their assigns as the first action, (2) the claim to be barred must have been
brought or have been available in the first action, and (3) the first action must have
produced a final judgment on the merits of the claim." See Brigham Young Univ. v.
Tremco Consultants, Inc., 110 P.3d 678 (Utah 2005); Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork
Pipeline Corp., 913 P.2d 731, 733 (Utah 1995), and Macris & Assocs., Inc. v. Newavs,
Inc., 16 P.3d 1214 (Utah 2000). Collateral Estoppel (issue preclusion) does not apply,
unless four elements are satisfied: (1) [t]he party against whom issue preclusion is
asserted must have been a party to or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; (2)
the issue decided in the prior adjudication must be identical to the one presented in the
instant action; (3) the issue in the first action must have been completely, fully, and fairly
litigated; and (4) the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits. See
Brigham Young Univ. v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., supra: Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork
Pipeline Corp., supra, and Macris & Assocs., Inc. v. Newavs, Inc. supra. Appellee's
brief is entirely silent with respect to these cases, and he makes no attempt to show that
he satisfied their requirements in the district court —instead of insisting that the

requirements were simply not at issue [RT, 8, Lines 5-11] because he could not satisfy
them.
Appellee relies exclusively upon Olsen v. Board of Education 571 P.2d 1336
(1976) (although he fails to draw an analogy between the facts in Olsen and this action),
apparently as some sort of refutation or qualification of Brigham Young Univ. v. Tremco
Consultants, Inc., 110 P.3d 678 (Utah 2005), Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp.,
913 P.2d 731, 733 (Utah 1995), and Macris & Assocs., Inc. v. Newavs, Inc., 16 P.3d
1214 (Utah 2000) concerning the requirements of res judicata. But Olsen is entirely in
line with the foregoing authorities. No cause of action (or issue necessary to the
determination of the cause of action) filed in one court is impacted by res judicata unless
the cause of action was actually brought and tried on the merits or could have been
brought and tried on the merits in the prior, separate court proceeding Olsen 571 P.2d at
1338. But appellee makes no attempt at all to demonstrate that any cause of action
alleged in the First Amended Complaint in the state court was actually brought or could
have been brought in the federal bankruptcy court -much less tried on the merits there.
None of the causes of action filed in this state court proceeding were also filed in the
federal bankruptcy proceedings.3 And as the district court itself noted, none of the claims
could have been filed in federal bankruptcy court because the federal bankruptcy court
lacked jurisdiction to consider them [RT-4]. Meanwhile, appellee is utterly and
necessarily silent with respect to his failure to satisfy the requirements of collateral
estopple (issue preclusion) because the federal bankruptcy court simply refused to
3

Indeed, the hearing held to settle the debtor's estate was not even an adversary proceeding.
10

conduct an evidentiary hearing of any kind on any issue pertaining to any cause of action
alleged in the state court proceedings.
C. Appellee Has Also Failed to Show That the Alleged Settlement Document
Impacted Counts Two and Three of the First Cause of Action for Abuse of Process,
the Second Cause of Action for Fraud, or the Third Cause of Action for Negligence
Even the alleged settlement agreement (the sham document, which Toscano
presented to the court) is relevant to only count one of the First Cause of Action for
Abuse of Process contained in the First Amended Complaint.4 The alleged effective date
of the sham settlement document is March 30, 2009, and it pertains to conduct, which
Toscano committed in 2008. But all of the facts and events alleged in support of counts
two and three of the First Cause of Action for Abuse of Process, the Second Cause of
Action for Fraud, and the Third Cause of Action for Negligence occurred after the
alleged effective date of the sham settlement agreement. Hence, even the sham settlement
document fails to include counts two and three of the First Cause of Action for Abuse of
Process, the Second Cause of Action for Fraud, and the Third Cause of Action for
Negligence, which arise from acts that Toscano committed after he allegedly entered into
a settlement agreement effective March 30, 2009 for claims that arose from his 2008
conduct.
Notwithstanding, appellee and the trial court (after, in essence, giving collateral
estoppel effect to the bankruptcy court order in error) interpret the sham settlement
document to mean that appellant agreed to waive all claims against Toscano, including
4

The claim for abuse of process referred to in the sham document is the claim that arose
from Toscano's filing of a frivolous Chapter 7 proceeding inflagrantabuse of the federal
bankruptcy laws in 2008 —count one (and only count one) of the First Cause of Action.
11

claims for liability for any act that Toscano might commit after March 30,2009 or in
other words anytime in the future, including tomorrow. Here is the language that the
court and appellee rely upon:
[T]he parties hereby mutually release each other from any and all
claims, debts, obligations, actions, demands, liabilities, costs,
expenses, attorneys fees, damages, real property (sic) or
controversies of any kind (sic) or nature whatsoever (sic), including
any actions for abuse of process or malicious prosecution, whether
grounded in law or equity, whether known or unknown, in any way
relating to or arising out of the claims and defenses raised in the
lawsuit, the adversary proceeding, or any motions or actions in any
court, tribunal, administrative proceeding, of any kind or any nature
whatsoever ....
To be sure, Toscano has written the sham release to include acts known or
unknown at the time of the alleged agreement. This is a common addition important in
California and perhaps Utah. But releasing a party from liability for acts (including any
actions for abuse of process) "known and unknown" at the time of settlement is a far cry
from releasing the party from liability for all future acts {mc\\xdmg future, distinct abuses
of process and fraud and negligence). Nothing in even Toscano's sham release can be
fairly or even reasonably interpreted to mean that the parties allegedly intended that
Toscano would be released from liability for any act, which he might commit after the
effective date of the alleged settlement agreement. Toscano and the trial court have
simply read the term "any and all future acts" into the sham document. What is more,
Toscano failed to introduce any sort of evidence or legal authority in the trial court (much
less evidence or authorities that would entitle to him to judgment as a matter of law) that
leads to a necessary legal conclusion that the foregoing language means that appellant
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released Toscano from liability for any act that Toscano might (still) commit in the future,.
Nothing in law, fact, or equity warrants such a radical interpretation and conclusion.
IV
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, appellant respectfully requests that the court reverse the
trial court's order entering summary judgment of the First Amended Complaint on
February 24, 2010. Appellant also respectfully requests that the court award costs of
appeal.

Respectfully Submitted,
Joseph Billings
Appellant, In Pro Per
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Law offices of Paul Toscano and Paul Guyon
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